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Abstract
This thesis studies repeated games with pure strategies and stochastic dis-
counting under perfect information. We consider infinite repetitions of any
finite normal form game possessing at least one pure Nash action profile. We
consider stochastic discounting processes satisfying Markov property, Martin-
gale property, having bounded increments (across time) and possessing an
infinite state space with a rich ergodic subset. We further require that there
are states of the stochastic process with the resulting stochastic discount fac-
tor arbitrarily close to 0, and such states can be reached with positive (yet
possibly arbitrarily small) probability in the long run. In this study, a player’s
discount factor is such a process. In this setting, we, not only establish the
(subgame perfect) Folk Theorem, but also prove the main result of this study:
In any equilibrium path, the occurrence of any finite number of consecutive
repetitions of the period Nash action profile, must almost surely happen within
a finite time window. That is, any equilibrium strategy almost surely contains
arbitrary long realizations of consecutive period Nash action profiles.
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SONSUZ TEKRARLI OYUNLARDA STOKASTI˙K I˙SKONTOLAMA:
NEREDEYSE KAC¸INILMAZI BEKLEMEK
Can U¨rgu¨n
Ekonomi Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2011
Tez Danıs¸manı: Mehmet Barlo
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sonsuz Tekrarlı Oyunlar; Stokastik I˙skontolama;
Stokastik Oyunlar; Folk Teoremi; Varıs¸ Zamanı
O¨zet
Bu tez tam bilgi altında sonsuz tekrar edilen ve stokastik olarak iskonto edilen
oyunlar hakkındadır. Bu c¸alıs¸mamızda ic¸inde en az bir adet saf stratejiler-
den olus¸an Nash dengesi bulunan sonsuz tekrarlı oyunları inceliyoruz. Bu
oyunlarda stokastik iskonto su¨rec¸leri Markov o¨zellig˘ini ve martingale o¨zellig˘ini
ic¸eren, sınırlı artıs¸ları olan ve sonsuz bir durumlar uzayına, ve bu uzayın ic¸inde
zengin bir ısrarlı durum uzayına sahip olan su¨rec¸lerle ilgileniyoruz. Ayrıca
bu durum uzayının 0 a c¸ok yakın elemanları olmasını da istemekteyiz. Tu¨m
bu s¸artlar sag˘landıg˘ı durumda yalnızca alt-oyun yetkin Folk teoremini deg˘il
aynı zamanda bu c¸alıs¸manın ana sonucunu da elde etmekteyiz: hangi denge
patikası olursa olsun, o patikanın ic¸erisinde uzun, ardıs¸ık periyodlar su¨resince
saf stratejilerden olus¸an Nash dengesi hareketleri, neredeyse kesinlikle sonlu
bir gelecek ic¸erisinde go¨zlenmek zorundadır.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis our aim is to consider strategic interactions where a stage game,
a normal form game in which players make simultaneous choices, is played
infinitely often and the parties involved discount future returns in a stochastic
manner.
Repeated games are standard models used in analyzing strategic interac-
tions that occur repeatedly. Thus, they constitute the cornerstone of modeling
dynamic strategic relations, hence, are essential in the theory of economics.
In fact, repeated games are a certain type of simple dynamic games in which
players face the same stage game in every period. The results obtained from
infinitely repeated games depend critically on the number of repetitions and
change drastically from cases where the stage game is played a finite number
of times.
The important feature of the repeated game structure is the ability of
players to condition their actions to the past. This distinctive ability of players
1
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allows game theorists to obtain very attractive and striking results that cannot
be obtained in standard one shot games, as Robert Aumann also points out
in his Nobel Prize Lecture:
The theory of repeated games is able to account for phenom-
ena such as altruism, cooperation, trust, loyalty, revenge, threats
(self destructive or otherwise), phenomena that may at first seem
irrational, in terms of the “selfish” utility-maximizing paradigm of
game theory and neoclassical economics. That it “accounts” for
such phenomena does not mean that people deliberately choose to
take revenge, or to act generously, out of consciously self-serving,
rational motives. Rather, over the millennia, people have evolved
norms of behavior that are by and large successful, indeed opti-
mal. Such evolution may actually be biological, genetic. Or, it
may (even) be “memetic”.
Clearly, the techniques and results in repeated games are widespread not
only in the economics theory, but also in the theories of biology, finance,
operation research and political science. In order to discuss some of these
results, we need to introduce some notions that will be employed.
1.1 Payoff Notions
In finitely repeated games, the payoffs associated with the game are usually
defined as the sum of the payoffs obtained at each period. Particularly, this
notion of summing through period payoffs becomes problematic in infinitely
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repeated games as the total payoff implies an infinite sum that might not
converge to a finite value. Thus, an intuitive method of forming payoffs is to
consider discounted (i.e. geometrically weighted) summation of period returns.
However, identifying payoffs in infinitely repeated games is not restricted
to this particular method hinted above. In general, obtaining a payoff in an
infinitely repeated game involves mapping an infinite sequence of real numbers
into a single one. One may find situations in which considering simple average
returns more plausible than discounted ones. Likewise, there also may be
situations in which the payoff of the infinitely repeated game is given by the
infimum of the infinite sequence of real numbers, each of which corresponds to
some period returns. 1 Thus, one may imagine many forms of payoff notions
for infinitely repeated games.
In the literature of repeated games, the following three forms of payoff
notions are widely used: Payoffs’ description by limits of the means is consid-
ered by Aumann and Shapley (1994), overtaking criterion is due to Rubinstein
(1979) and the most common description is the discounting payoff structure
in which players’ payoffs at the end of the repeated game is the summation of
discounted stage game payoffs obtained at each stage.
1Consider a strategic interaction where two countries decide whether or not to launch
nuclear missiles toward each other at every period. In such a game it might be argued that
the above given payoff notion is plausible. This is because, any one of the parties being the
subject of a nuclear attack, even though once, is more than enough.
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1.1.1 Limits of the Means
In the limits of the means payoff notion in an infinitely repeated game, return
streams (infinite sequence of real numbers, each of which corresponds to some
return obtained in some period) are evaluated with respect to the average
returns associated in order to obtain payoffs. In other words, every period is
equally important.
The drawback of this evaluation criterion is that anything that happens
finitely often (no matter how large this finite integer may be) does not matter
at all. Clearly, such a restriction imposed by this payoff notion limits the scope
of applications to be considered. Consequently, one may even argue that such
a payoff notion makes the game somewhat pathological. To see this, consider
the following infinite sequence of real numbers: For every period up to T , the
period return is 1; and thereafter it is 0. Under the notion of limits of the
means, this sequence will be associated with a payoff 0, no matter how big T
maybe.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to think of situations, in which, deci-
sion makers put overwhelming emphasis on the long run averages rather than
the short run concerns. An extreme form of this concern is reflected with the
payoff notion of the limits of the means.
1.1.2 Overtaking
The overtaking payoff notion of an infinitely repeated game is developed by
Rubinstein (1979) in order to keep the advantages of the limits of the means
payoff notion, while overcoming its most serious shortcoming: The return
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streams are evaluated with respect to the average payoffs associated, how-
ever, this notion also emphasizes single period differences between two return
streams. In other words, this criterion also treats each period equally (i.e.
placing the priority to the long run), while allowing a single period to affect
the overall payoff structure. More details along with examples will be given in
the next chapter of this thesis.
In the literature, the payoff notions of limits of the means and overtaking
criterion is often referred to as the no discounting payoff notions.
1.1.3 Discounting
In the discounting payoff structure of repeated games, return streams are eval-
uated with respect to the discounted summation of returns. Furthermore, the
discounted summations are normalized in order to associate them with overall
payoff values.
This payoff notion does not treat periods equally, and puts greater emphasis
on returns obtained in the short run. However, long run concerns are also
present, and they can be captured under the consideration of high discount
factors.
It is important to remark that discounting is the most common payoff
structure in the literature. Moreover, the level of the discount factor is often
referred to as the patience of a particular decision maker.
Next, we wish to introduce one of the most important results in the the-
ory of economics. But before doing that, we need to define the notion of
equilibrium.
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1.2 Subgame Perfection
This concept, which is the standard notion of equilibrium in extensive form
games under perfect information, is due to Reinhard Selten, initially intro-
duced in Selten (1965) and later criticized and extended in Selten (1975).
Due to his contributions, he was awarded the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences (shared with John Harsanyi and John Nash).
The basic motivation for this equilibrium concept is that common knowl-
edge of rationality implies that rationality should be expected in all of the
states of the game. Informally, given what has happened in the past, agents
look forward to do the best they can from that point on, provided that they
have such a foresight in all the states of the remainder of the game.
Consequently, subgame perfection asks for each player’s plan of actions,
strategies, to be optimal starting at any given history of the game. That is,
there should not be any histories such that a player finds it optimal to deviate
from the prescribed behavior, if that behavior is subgame perfect. That is
why subgame perfection treats all histories in the same fashion, unlike Nash
equilibrium which discriminates between histories that will happen (under the
given prescribed behavior) and histories that will never be reached (often called
off the path behavior).
It needs to be pointed out that this notion of equilibrium can be used with
any of the payoff notions discussed in the previous section.
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1.3 Folk Theorems
An important observation emerges in the analysis of infinitely repeated games:
With sufficiently patient players or under the payoff notions of no discounting,
an infinitely repeated game permits players to design a joint long run behavior,
supported by threats, which result in equilibria with socially optimal (in the
Pareto sense) outcomes. When the equilibrium notion of subgame perfection
is employed, then these threats have to be enforceable (i.e. credible). Such
threats, in turn, sustain behavior described above because in an infinitely
repeated game a player always has enough time to credibly retaliate, i.e. to
punish a deviator in an enforceable manner.
On the other hand, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem2, one of the most
hated–celebrated results in repeated games, simply displays that the above
given construction (with either sufficiently patient players or under the payoff
notions of no discounting) can be employed to support in subgame perfection
not only the Pareto optimal outcomes, but also any payoff profile that can be
obtained as a result of an individually rational behavior profile in the repeated
game. It should be pointed out that we say that a behavior is individually
rational whenever it results in a payoff vector in which each players’ payoff
exceeds the least return level that he could guarantee to himself in the stage
game. Thus, behavior that is not individually rational can never be sustained
under subgame perfection, because then the relevant player could simply de-
viate and continue even with the least payoff that he can guarantee to himself
2This name is due to the fact that there is no well defined author of the first version of
it.
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in the stage game.
It should be noticed that the payoffs that one needs to concentrate on
are the individually rational ones. This is because, as was displayed in the
previous paragraph, payoffs that are not individually rational can never be
obtained with subgame perfection.
However, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem, displays that any individually
rational payoff vector can obtained under subgame perfection with sufficiently
patient players. This, in turn, implies that game theoretic analysis of infinitely
repeated games does not have any predictive power, because anything goes.
Therefore, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem is a powerful and negative result.
Consequently, the systematic check of whether or not the Folk Theorem holds
in various settings is of great value in the theory of economics.
Subgame perfect Folk Theorems under various settings have been proven
with the limit of the means and overtaking criterion payoff notions. The most
significant of those are by Aumann and Shapley (1994), for the limits of the
means payoff notion, and Rubinstein (1979) for the overtaking criterion notion.
However, since this thesis will be concentrated on discounting, we will not put
further emphasis on no discounting payoff notions.
In infinitely repeated discounted games, Folk Theorems have been proven
under a variety of settings as well. The pioneering works on the subgame
perfect Folk Theorem in infinitely repeated discounted games was done by
Aumann and Shapley (1994) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), where they
showed the following: Any individual rational payoff for the one-shot game
can be achieved as the discounted, normalized payoff of the repeated game via
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the use of public randomization, a technical tool which is often interpreted
as communication among the players in the stage game. Later in Fudenberg
and Maskin (1991), it is shown that public randomization is inessential, hence
can be dispensed with, for their subgame perfect Folk Theorem. The con-
siderations of limited memory and bounded rationality, does not change this
conclusion documented by Kalai and Stanford (1988), Sabourian (1998), Barlo,
Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2007). Con-
sidering cases where the actions of other players are not perfectly observable,
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2006), Mailath
and Olszewski (2011) show that the Folk Theorem still holds. For the in-
stances when there is uncertainty about the returns of the stage game, Dutta
(1995), Fudenberg and Yamamato (2010), Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and
Vieille (2010), show that the Folk Theorem still remains.
Out of these Folk Theorems, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and Fudenberg
and Maskin (1991) are of special interest to us. In those studies, they not
only obtain the subgame perfect Folk Theorem but also dispense with the use
of public randomization. They also develop techniques generating any indi-
vidual rational outcome exactly as a sequence of actions while the resulting
continuation values are within the neighborhood of the desired payoff level.
Furthermore, in order to sustain such sequences in the presence of unobserv-
able mixed actions, they show that a uniform level on the discount factor,
strictly below one, can be identified so that the continuation values still re-
main the same, regardless of the realized actions as long as they are in the
support of the equilibrium behavior. If any of the realized actions is not in
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the support of the permitted equilibrium behavior, punishments are triggered.
These punishments have to be credible, thus, they are constructed so that
conforming with the prescribed behavior always results in a higher (continu-
ation) payoff than the one obtained by deviating today and being punished
from thereon. Often, this construction is referred to as the enforceability of
the punishments.
1.4 Our Contributions
As discussed above, the Folk Theorems of Aumann and Shapley (1994) and Fu-
denberg and Maskin (1986) establish that payoffs which can be approximated
in equilibrium with patient players are equal the set of individually rational
ones. Players’ ability to coordinate their actions using past behavior allows
such a large set of equilibria. In turn, this vast multiplicity of equilibrium pay-
offs, considerably weakens the predictive power of game theoretic analysis. 3
An important aspect of these findings is the use of constant discounting. The
accepted interpretation of the use of discounting in repeated games, offered by
Rubinstein (1982) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), is that the discount
factor determines a player’s perception about the probability of the game con-
tinuing into the next period. Thus, constant discounting implies that this
3Moreover, the consideration of limited memory and bounded rationality, lack of perfect
observability of the other players’ behavior and the past, and uncertainty of future payoffs
do not change this conclusion, documented by Kalai and Stanford (1988), Sabourian (1998),
Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2007); Fudenberg,
Levine, and Maskin (1994), Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2006), Mailath and Olszewski (2011);
Dutta (1995), Fudenberg and Yamamato (2010), and Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille
(2010).
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probability is independent of the history of the game, in particular, invariant.
On the other hand, keeping the same interpretation, but allowing for the
discount factor to depend on the history of the game and/or vary across time,
is not extensively analyzed in the literature on repeated games. Indeed, to our
knowledge, the only relevant work in the study of repeated games is Baye and
Jansen (1996) which considers stochastic discounting with period discounting
shocks independent from the history of the game. Related work concerning
stochastic interest rates can be found in the theory of finance, see Ross (1976),
Harrison and Kreps (1979), and Hansen and Richard (1987).
In this thesis, we consider a wide class of games with stochastic discount-
ing, when the discounting process is not independent of the past and has a
rich state space. In such a setting, we impose the restriction that players
expectation of the future discount factor is equal to the current one, and only
the current value is relevant when trying to make assertions about the future
values of the discount factor. Under this construction, we not only prove a
Folk Theorem for repeated games with stochastic discounting, but we also,
show that no matter how patient players are, every subgame perfect equilib-
rium path must entail arbitrarily long (yet, finite) consecutive repetitions of
period Nash behavior, and these consecutive periods almost surely happen in
a finite time window.
In order to present these results in full detail, the next chapter presents
the preliminaries for infinitely repeated games. Chapter 3, on the other hand,
will introduce the notion of stochastic discounting, and we will present our
contributions in chapter 4. Finally, chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Let G = (N, (Ai, ui)i∈N ) be a normal form game with |N | ∈ N and, for all
i ∈ N , Ai is player i’s actions with property that |Ai| ∈ N; and i’s payoff
function denoted by ui : A → R where A =
∏
i∈N Ai and A−i =
∏
j 6=iAi.
Writing A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} let wk = u(ak). Thus, {w1, w2, . . . , wm} is the
set of payoff vectors in G corresponding to pure strategies.
Let, for all i ∈ N , Si = ∆(Ai); the set Si is the set of mixed actions
for player i. We abuse notation and let ui, for all i ∈ N , denote the usual
mixed-extension. Let S = S1 × · · · × Sn and let
u(S) = {(ui)i∈N ∈ R
N : (ui)i∈N = (ui(s))i∈N for some s ∈ S}.
Let, for i ∈ N ,
vi ≡ min
s−i∈S−i
max
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i),
and let mi ∈ S be such that ui(m
i) = maxsi ui(si, m
i
−i) = vi. The number
12
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vi denotes the minmax payoff of player i in G, and m
i is some action com-
bination that is an optimal punishment of player i in G. Notice that, vi is
the least payoff level that player i can guarantee to himself. Similarly, define
u¯i ≡ maxs−i∈S−i maxsi∈Si ui(si, s−i), u¯i denotes the highest returns player i can
get in the stage game.
The set of individually rational payoffs is denoted by
U = {u ∈ co (u(A)) : ui ≥ vi for all i ∈ N} ,
and the set of strictly individually rational payoffs by
U0 = {u ∈ co(u(A) : ui > vi for all i ∈ N}.
The supergame G¯ consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G taking
place in periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . . Moreover, we denote N0 = N ∪ {0}.
Thus, for k ≥ 1, a k−stage history is a k−length sequence h¯k = (a1, . . . , ak),
where, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, at ∈ A; the space of all k−stage histories is H¯k, i.e.,
H¯k = A
k (the k−fold Cartesian product of A). We use e¯ for the unique 0–stage
history, it is a 0–length history that represents the beginning of the supergame.
The set of all histories is defined by H¯ =
⋃∞
n=0 H¯n.
For every h¯ ∈ H¯ , define h¯r ∈ A to be the projection of h¯ onto its rth
coordinate. For every h¯ ∈ H¯, we let ℓ(h¯) denote the length of h¯. For two
positive length histories, h¯ and h¯′ in H¯ , we define the concatenation of h¯ and
h¯′, in that order, to be the history (h¯ · h¯′) of length ℓ(h¯) + ℓ(h¯′): (h¯ · h¯′) =
(h¯1, h¯2, . . . , h¯ℓ(h¯), h¯′1, h¯′2, . . . , h¯′ℓ(h¯
′)). We follow the convention that, e¯ · h¯ =
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h¯ · e¯ = h¯ for every h¯ ∈ H¯.
Remember that, we assume that the game has perfect information, in other
words, we assume that at stage k each player knows h¯k. Regarding strategies,
players employ behavioral strategies, that is, in each stage k, they choose a
function from H¯k−1 to Ai, denoted f¯
k
i , for player i ∈ N . The set of player
i’s strategies is denoted by F¯i, and F¯ =
∏
i∈N F¯i is the joint strategy space.
Finally, a strategy vector is f¯ =
({
f¯ki
}∞
k=1
)
i∈N
.
Given an individual strategy f¯i ∈ F¯i, and a history h¯ ∈ H¯ we denote the
individual strategy induced at h¯ by f¯i|h¯. This strategy is defined pointwise
on H¯ : (f¯i|h¯)(h¯′) = f¯i(h¯ · h¯′), for every h¯′ ∈ H¯. We will use (f¯ |h¯) to denote
(f¯1|h¯, . . . , f¯n|h¯) for every f¯ ∈ A and h¯ ∈ H¯ . We let F¯i(f¯i) = {f¯i|h¯ : h¯ ∈ H¯}
and F¯ (f¯) = {f¯ |h¯ : h¯ ∈ H¯}.
Any strategy f¯ ∈ F¯ induces an outcome π¯(f¯) ∈ A∞ as follows: π¯1(f¯) =
f¯(e¯), π¯k(f¯) = f¯(π¯1(f¯), . . . , π¯k−1(f¯)), for k ∈ N. Letting A∞ = A× A× · · · ,
we have defined a function π¯ : F¯ → A∞, which gives the outcome induced by
any strategy.
2.1 Payoff Notions in Repeated Games
Suppose that, U¯i : S
∞ → R represents the preference relation of player i on
S∞. We now can define the notions of Nash and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Note that, when required we abuse notation letting,
U¯i(f¯) = U¯i(π¯(f¯)).
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Definition. A strategy vector f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium of G¯ if for
all i ∈ N , U¯i(f¯) ≥ U¯i(f¯ ′i, f¯−i) for all f¯
′
i ∈ F¯i. A strategy vector f¯ ∈ F¯ is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of G¯ if every f¯ ∈ F¯ (f¯) is a Nash equilibrium.
We will be working with three notions of returns in the supergame G¯.
The first two are the no-discounting cases, and there the notion of limits of
the means, and overtaking criterion, will be introduced. The final one is the
discounting case, where all the agents discount future returns.
Definition (Limits of Means). The limit of means payoff in the supergame
of G, G¯ for a given π¯ ∈ S∞ is
U¯i(π¯) = lim
T→∞
inf
1
T
T∑
t=1
ui(π¯
t).
The logic behind the limits of means criterion is that, most research dealing
with non-discounted supergames assume that, players try to maximize their
average payoffs. More precisely, if π¯ and π¯′ are both outcome paths then,
player i’s strict preference ordering ≻i is assumed to be
π¯ ≻i π¯
′ ⇔ lim
T→∞
inf
1
T
T∑
t=1
(ui(π¯
t)− ui(π¯
′t)) > 0.
Limit inferior is used instead of the regular limit notion, as only a bound on
the “limit” of the payoff stream is necessary. Technically, limit inferior always
exists since the payoffs are real numbers, whereas, the existence of a limit is
not guaranteed, the (averaged) stream itself may as well be unbounded.
The drawback of the evaluation criterion is that, anything that happens in a
Chapter 2. Preliminaries 16
finite time interval does not matter at all. The sequence (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1, . . .),
in which M zeros are followed by a constant sequence of 1’s, is preferred by
the limit of means criterion to (1, 0, 0, . . . ), for every value of M , no matter
how large M is.
Due to the shortcomings of the limit of means criterion, we now will intro-
duce the other no-discounting payoff, Ramsey/Weiszacker overtaking criterion.
The most famous paper pioneering in the analysis of infinitely repeated games
with these two criteria is Rubinstein (1979), which is based on Roth (1976).
Definition (Overtaking). The overtaking criterion in the supergame of G,
G¯ is a preference relation ≻o defined by: for any outcome paths π¯, π¯′ ∈ A∞
π¯ ≻oi π¯
′ ⇔ lim
T→∞
inf
T∑
t=1
(ui(π¯
t)− ui(π¯
′t)) > 0
.
The overtaking criterion is considered to be a stronger version of the limit
of means criterion. Therefore, all the results relating to equilibria with the
overtaking criterion would also hold for the limit of means criterion.
According to the overtaking criterion, the sequence (−1, 2, 0, 0, . . .) is pre-
ferred to (0, 0, . . .), but the two sequences are indifferent according to the limit
of means criterion. On the other hand, the sequences (1,−1, 0, 0, . . .) and
(0, 0, . . .) are indifferent according to both criteria.
The following gives a representation of preferences over a given outcome
path π ∈ A∞ with discounting, using a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
Definition (Discounting). The discounting payoff in the supergame of G,
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G¯ is, for δ ∈ [0, 1), for a given π¯ ∈ A∞ is the discounted sum of stage game
payoffs:
U¯ δi (π¯) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=1
δk−1ui(π¯
k).
Clearly, defining V¯i : A
∞ → R by
V¯i(π¯) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=1
δk−1ui(π¯
k).
Note that, we have U¯i = V¯i ◦ π¯. For π¯ ∈ A
∞, k ∈ N, and i ∈ N , we let
V¯ ki (π) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=k
δt−kui(πt),
be called the player i’s value function in date k under π¯, and it denotes the
continuation payoff of player i, starting from period k, under π¯ ∈ A∞.
To see more about the distinction of these three concepts consider the
following examples: The sequence (1,−1, 0, 0, . . .) is preferred for any δ ∈ [0, 1)
to the sequence (0, 0, . . .). However, according to the other two criteria, the
two sequences are indifferent. Finally, the sequence (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1, . . .), in
which M zeros are followed by a constant sequence of 1’s, is preferred by the
limit of means criterion to (1, 0, 0, . . . ) for every value ofM . On the other hand,
for every δ ∈ [0, 1), there exists M∗ large enough, so that for all M > M∗, the
latter is preferred to the former according to the discounting criterion for the
fixed value of δ.
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2.2 Folk Theorem Without Public Random-
ization
In this section, we will focus on the Folk Theorem without Public Random-
ization of Fudenberg and Maskin (1991). The proof of this essential result is
included in this thesis because that we will be using some of the ingredients of
the proof in our constructing, hence, would like to present them in full detail
Theorem (Folk Theorem Without Public Randomization). Consider an n-
player game, in which public randomization is not available and only the play-
ers’ choice of actions are observable, assume that the dimension of U0 is equal
to n. Then, for any u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ U
0, there is a δ < 1 such that for
all δ ∈ (δ, 1), there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated
game with discount factor δ, in which the discounted average payoffs are u.
Proof. Consider u′ in the interior of U0 such that u′i < ui for all i. Take ρ > 0
such that for all players i the vector u′(i) = (u′1 + ρ . . . u
′
i−1 + ρ, u
′
i, u
′
i+1 +
rho, . . . , u′n + ρ) is in U
0. Furthermore, set u′(0) = u Let wji = ui(m
j) be
player i’s period payoff when j is being punished with mj . Choose ε > 0 such
that for all i and j, ε < u′j and −w
j
i <
u′
i
−ε
u′
i
(ρ − wji ). Then, by the Lemma
presented below, there exists some δε such that for all δ > δε and each i, there
exists deterministic sequences {ai(t, δ)}, whose average discounted payoffs are
u′i, and whose continuation payoffs are within ε of u
′
i.
Lemma. For any ε > 0, there exists δε such that for all δ ≥ δε, and every
u ∈ U0 with ui ≥ ε for all i, there is a deterministic sequence of pure strategies
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whose discounted average payoffs are u, and whose continuation payoffs at each
time t are within ε of u.
Proof. Given any u in U0, and ε > 0, let ε′ = ε/4. Let B(u, ε′) = {u′ ∈ U0 :
‖u′− u‖ < ε′} be the ball of radius ε′ centered at u. Let Z be a polygon with
vertices {zl} such that: (i) each zl is within 2ε′ of u, (ii) every u′ ∈ B(u, ε′)
can be expressed as a convex combination of {zl}, and (iii) each zl can be
expressed as
∑
k = 1
mλk(l)wk, where each weight λk(l) is a rational number
between zero and one, and the weights sum to 1. Since the weights are rational,
one can find integers c and {rk(l)}mk=1 such that for all l and k, λ
k(l) = rk(l)/c.
Let cycle l be the c-period sequence of pure strategies, in which a1 is played
for the first r1(l) periods, a2 is played for the first r2(l) periods and so on.
Let zl(δ) be the average discounted payoff of cycle l. Using the algoritmh of
Sorin (1986) (which is also their lemma 1) with zl(δ), they verify that they
can generate each u′ ∈ B(u, ε′) by a sequence zl(δ)′s for δ > 1 − 1/m. Now,
for any given u′ each of these cycles are of length c, and each zl(δ) is in 3ε′
of u′. Then, for all u ∈ U0 and all ε > 0 there is a δ < 1 such that for all
δ > δ, and all u′ ∈ B(u, ε/4), there is a deterministic sequence whose payoffs
are equal to u′ and whose continuation payoffs at each date are within ε of u
and u′.
Now, consider the set Q = {u ∈ U0 : ui ≥ ε for all i}. The collection
B =
⋃
u∈QB(u, ε/4) is an open cover of Q and Q is compact, therefore, B has
a finite subcover. Using that subcover, let δε be the maximum of associated
δ′s. Then, for all u ∈ Q, there is a deterministic sequence with properties
asserted by lemma.
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Choose δ > δε such that for all δ > δ, there exists an integer N(δ) such
that for all i and j, the following holds:
(1− δ)u¯i + δ
N(δ)+1u′i < u
′
i − ε
(1− δ)u¯i + δ
N(δ)+1u′i < (1− δ
N(δ))wji + δ
N(δ)(u′i + ρ)
(1− δ)u¯i + δ
N(δ)+1u′i < (1− δ)w
j
i + δ(u
′
i + ρ)
If there is more than one such integer, let N(δ) be the smallest. Now, consider
the following strategy for player i:
(A) Begin by playing the sequence {a0i (t, δ)}, and continue to do so as long
as {a0(t, δ)} was played the previous period or at least two players deviated
that period.
(Bj) Play mji for N(δ) periods, if player k unilaterally chooses an action
outside the support of mji , go to phase B
k, ignore simultaneous deviations.
(Cj) At the end of phase Bj switch to phase Cj , which requires further
explanation. Observe that, in the presence of mixed minmax strategies, the
payoffs of Bj will be a random variable. Let rji be the player i’s discounted
average payoff during phase Bj . Furthermore, set
zji =

 r
j
i (1− δ
N(δ))/δN(δ) i 6= j
0 i = j.
Let {a(t, δ, {zji })} be a deterministic sequence that results in the payoffs (u
′
i+
ρ− zj1, . . . , u
′
j−1+ ρ− z
j
j−1, u
′
j, u
′
n+ ρ− z
j
n, u
′
n + ρ− z
j
n), with the continuation
values being in ε neighborhood of these values. Now, we are ready to define
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the strategy at (Cj).
(Cj) Play {ai(t, δ, {z
j
i })} unless player k unilaterally deviates, in which case
go to (Bk). Observe that, by the construction of (Cj), each player i 6= j is
indifferent among all actions during punishment phase (Bj). His continuation
payoff is equal to δN(δ)(ui + ρ) regardless of the actions realized.
Now, due to the selection of δε, deviating at phase (A) then conforming
gives a continuation value strictly less than u′i − ε. If a player who is being
punished deviates during phase (B), he receives δ · δN(δ)u′i, which is strictly
less than δN(δ)u′i, the punishment payoff. If a player i deviates from phase
Bj , again the selection of δε ensures that deviating results in a strictly worse
payoff. Finally, if a player i deviates at (Ck), deviation will result in a payoff
strictly less than u′i − ε. Therefore, no player will find it profitable to deviate
at any date of any phase. Now, the only thing to show is the existence of
the sequences of actions used in (Cj). Now, consider the sequence {(εn, δn)},
where εn tends to 0 and δn tends to 1. Then, rearranging the equations used
in identifying δε, we reach
δN(δ)+1 < (u′i − ε− (1− δ)u¯i)/u
′
i.
However, when εn tends to 0 and δn tends to 1, the right-hand side tends to
1, implying δ
N(δn)
n ≈ 1 for n sufficiently large similarly, z
j
i ≈ 0 and ρ− z
j
i > 0.
Moreover, for large n the payoffs are in the interior of U0, and bounded away
from the axes by at least εn. Now, using the lemma presented earlier ascertains
the existence of {ai(t, δ, {z
j
i })}, as was to be shown.
Chapter 3
Stochastic Discounting
The accepted interpretation of the use of discounting in repeated games, offered
by Rubinstein (1982) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), is that the discount
factor determines the probability of the strategic interaction surviving into
the next period. Thus, constant discounting implies that this probability is
independent of the history of the game, in particular, invariant. Keeping
the same interpretation, but allowing for the discount factor to depend on
the history of the game and/or vary across time, results in the consideration
of stochastic discounting, which in fact, is not extensively analyzed in the
literature on repeated games.
Particularly, a tangible set of applications of repeated games can be found
in industrial organization settings. In such settings, firms can invest at the
present rate of interest to obtain principal and interest tomorrow. Thus, in
such settings a natural interpretation of the discount factor would be 1
1+rt
,
where rt is the real interest rate between the periods t and t + 1. Under such
22
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a construction, the use of a constant discount factor would imply the interest
rates to be restricted to fixed constants. Clearly, one can easily see that a
model with the interest rate varying over time has more appeal. Surprisingly,
most of the results in the existing literature assume the discount factor be
deterministic. In order to formally represent time preferences with discount
factors (interest rates) that may vary over time, the one-shot discount factors
need to be a Stochastic Process.
This chapter introduces and presents the specifics of the construction of the
stochastic discounting that we will employ. It is appropriate to mention that,
in order to render a formal treatment, we have to go over some mathematical
concepts of the theory of probability.
3.1 Related Concepts in Probability Theory
Before defining how a stochastic discounting process is constructed, let us re-
view a few concepts in probability theory.
Definition (σ − algebra). Given a set Ω and its power set 2Ω, a set F ⊆ 2Ω
is a σ − algebra over Ω if (i)F is non-empty, (ii)for all A ∈ F , Ac ∈ F , and
(iii) for all countable collections {A1, A2, . . . , } in F , A1∪A2∪ . . . is in F . An
ordered pair (Ω,F), where F is a σ − algebra over Ω is called a measurable
space.
Definition (Measure). Given a set Ω and a σ−algebra, F of Ω, a function P :
F → R is called a measure if (i) P(E) ≥ 0 for all E ∈ F , (ii) for all countable
collections {Ei}i∈I of pairwise disjoint sets, P(
⋃
i∈I Ei) =
∑
i∈I P(Ei), and
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(iii) P(∅) = 0.
Definition (Probability Space). In probability theory, a probability space for
a probabilistic experiment(random variable) is a triple (Ω,F ,P), where Ω
denotes the set of outcomes of the probabilistic experiment, F denotes the
σ− algebra of Ω, the collection of all the events that are considered, and P is
a function, measuring the probability of an event.
Let us remind that P : F → [0, 1]. An event is considered to have happened
when the outcome is a member of the event. An outcome can be a member in
more than one events.
Definition (Measurable Function). Given two measurable spaces, (Ω,F) and
(S,B), a function X : Ω → S is called a measurable function if X−1(E) ∈ F
for every E ∈ B.
Definition (Random Variable). Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a
measurable space (S,B), a random variable X : Ω→ S is a measurable func-
tion.
Definition (Stochastic Process). Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P) a stochas-
tic process {Xt}t is a collection of random variables {Xt : t ∈ T}, where the
index t belongs to the index set T .
Definition (Filtration). Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a stochastic
process {Xt}t, a filtration is a collection of sub-σ−algebras of the σ−algebra
F such that if s ≤ t, Fs ⊂ Ft, and Xt is Ft measurable.
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Definition (Martingale Process). A process {Xt}t with a filtration {Ft}t sat-
isfies the martingale property if E (Xt|Fs) = Xs for all s ≤ t.
Definition (Markov Process). A process {Xt}t with a filtration {Ft}t satisfies
the Markov property if P(Xt+s ∈ B|Ft) = P(Xt+s ∈ B|Xt) for all s, t ∈ T .
With these theoretical preliminaries, we might say more about a stochas-
tic discounting process. Starting from the very basics, since for any kind of
discounting we must have δ ∈ (0, 1), the stochastic discounting processes we
consider also must have Ω ⊆ (0, 1).
The information of the players regarding the realizations of the stochastic
process can be captured by the filtration construction. If a random variable
is measurable in some σ − algebra, its value is known at that σ − algebra.
Furthermore, since the filtration is a collection of growing sets, at any Ft all
the values of X0, X1, . . . , Xt are known.
The martingale property, although not essential, is a nice property because
if we were to consider models in industrial organization where the decision
makers are firms and discount factors are inverse interest rates, the martingale
property is equivalent to a no-arbitrage condition. 1
The Markov property is a technically nice property. In repeated games,
the critical point is that players face the same continuation game at every
period. Without the Markov property, even in cases where the realizations in
two different periods are equal, players would have to face different situations
as the entire history of the process would be important. Thus, making the
1The usage of martingales as a notion of arbitrage free market conditions is common
practice in the theory of finance, documented by Harrison and Kreps (1979)
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analysis significantly difficult. Moreover, even tough the Markov property is
limiting, the efficient-market hypothesis of Fama (1970) lays the theoretical
framework, and provides empirical evidence supporting the use of Markovian
Models in Economic Analysis.
A stochastic discounting process is a stochastic process {dt}t, with an
outcome space Ω ⊆ (0, 1), and a suitable filtration {Ft}t. dt denotes the
discount factor from period t to period t + 1. Similar to the convention of
taking the n-th power of the discount factor for evaluating future returns, the
stochastic discount factor from period t to period τ , with τ > t, is defined by
multiplying the respective random variables,
∏τ−1
s=t ds.
3.2 An Example: Stochastic Discounting via
Polya’s Urn
A well known example of a stochastic process, that is a good candidate for
being a stochastic discounting process, is the normalized beta–binomial distri-
bution with two dimensions, more commonly known as the Polya’s urn scheme.
Define {dt}t as follows: Without loss of generality, let d0 = δˆ be a rational
number in (0, 1). Thence, δˆ = g
g+b
for some g, b ∈ N, where g is interpreted
as the number of “good”, b as the “bad”, balls in the urn. A ball is drawn
randomly, and is put back into the urn along with a new ball of the same
nature, and this process is repeated in each round. Thus, the support of
d1 is {
g+1
g+1+b
, g
g+1+b
} where the first observation happens with probability d0.
Inductively, for any t > 1 given dt−1 (a realization of dt−1) the support of dt
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equals { g+k+1
g+b+t
, g+k
g+b+t
} where k ≤ t denotes the number of good balls drawn up
to period t and the first element of this support is drawn with a probability
given by dt−1.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how the process proceeds starting from an initial value
of 6
10
and displays the possible states reachable in 3 turns.
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Figure 3.1: Polya Tree
In figure 3.1, the urn initially contains 6 good balls and 4 bad balls. Then,
a ball randomly drawn from the urn will be a good ball with 6
10
probability,
and a bad ball with 4
10
. Suppose we draw a good ball in the first turn, and
as dictated by the mechanism we put the good ball back in together with
a new good ball. Then, there will be 7 good balls in the urn and 11 balls
total, and the resulting ratio will be 7
11
. From this state, we will repeat the
experiment, but this time the probability of drawing a good ball will be 7
11
,
and the probability of drawing a bad ball will be 4
11
. Suppose this time we
draw a bad ball, and we return the bad ball to the urn with a new bad ball.
Then, there will be 7 good balls in the urn and 12 balls total. Our new state
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will be 7
12
. From this state, we will repeat the same experiment again, but this
time the probability of drawing a good ball will be 7
12
, and the probability of
drawing a bad ball will be 5
12
; which essentially means that in the next period,
the state will be 8
13
with probability 7
12
, and it will be 7
13
with probability 5
12
.
Given any initial value in δˆ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q, a Polya scheme has some very
nice properties, which makes it a good candidate for a stochastic discounting
process. First of all, observe that the process is defined as the number of
good balls over the number of total balls. Hence, it is easy to verify that
the only possible outcomes in the process are in (0, 1) ∩ Q. In other words,
Ω ⊆ (0, 1)∩Q. Furthermore, the process in the numerator, the number of good
balls, obviously satisfies the Markov property, since the number of good balls
can only increase by one or remain the same at any given period, regardless of
the history of the process. On the other hand, the process in the denominator
is a degenerate random process, it just increases by one at every period. Hence,
Polya scheme is also Markovian. 2 The Polya process also satisfies the other
nice property, it is a martingale process. Suppose at any time t ∈ N0 there are
g good balls, and b bad balls in the urn. Then, the value of the process will be
2In some sources, the Polya scheme is defined directly by the rational number obtained
from the ratio (of the number of good balls over the number of total balls). That is, such
definitions do not distinguish between having 1 good ball among 2 and having 50 good balls
among 100. Consequently the Markov property does not hold when such a definition is
employed. On the other hand, the same stochastic process can be defined by the number
of good balls divided by the total number of balls, where the information kept consists of
the number of good balls and the number of total balls. Then, the process is a Markovian
martingale. To see this, observe that a stochastic process defined by the number of good
balls is clearly Markovian, and it is a martingale with respect to 1 divided by the number
of total balls. For more information about martingales with respect to a specific filtration
we refer the reader to Karlin and Taylor (1975)
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g
g+b
= dt. Hence, the expected value of the process at time t + 1 is equal to:
E (dt+1|Ft) =
g
g + b
g + 1
g + b+ 1
+
b
g + b
g
g + b+ 1
=
g
g + b
.
Now, since time is discrete in the Polya Scheme, just showing one period ahead
is sufficient to show the martingale property. 3 Furthermore, even tough the
process may seem prone to snowballing, it will never become a degenerate
process. In fact, the probability of reaching from any rational number in (0, 1)
to another rational number in (0, 1) is always positive (although it might take
some time). In other words, the entire outcome space of Polya is ergodic. This
is also easy to verify because the support of dt equals {
g+k+1
g+b+t
, g+k
g+b+t
}, where
k ≤ t and for any t ∈ N the probability that k = n for any n ≤ t is strictly
positive. Hence, the normalized negative binomial process constitutes a good
example of a stochastic discounting process.
3For more information on discrete time Martingales, we refer the reader to Williams
(1991).
Chapter 4
Awaiting the Almost Inevitable
The Folk Theorems of Aumann and Shapley (1994) and Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986) establish that payoffs, which can be approximated in equilibrium with
patient players are equal the set of individually rational ones. The main rea-
son for this observation is players’ ability to coordinate their actions using
past behavior. In turn, this vast multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs, consid-
erably weakens the predictive power of game theoretic analysis. Moreover,
the consideration of limited memory and bounded rationality, lack of perfect
observability of the other players’ behavior and the past, and uncertainty of fu-
ture payoffs do not change this conclusion, documented by Kalai and Stanford
(1988), Sabourian (1998), Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), Barlo, Car-
mona, and Sabourian (2007); Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), Ho¨rner
and Olszewski (2006), Mailath and Olszewski (2011); Dutta (1995), Fudenberg
and Yamamato (2010), and Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2010). An
important aspect of all these findings is the use of constant discounting. The
30
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accepted interpretation of the use of discounting in repeated games, offered by
Rubinstein (1982) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), is that the discount
factor determines a player’s probability of surviving into the next period. Thus,
constant discounting implies that this probability is independent of the history
of the game, in particular, invariant.
On the other hand, keeping the same interpretation, but allowing for the
discount factor to depend on the history of the game and/or vary across time,
is not extensively analyzed in the literature on repeated games. Indeed, to our
knowledge, the only relevant work in the study of repeated games is Baye and
Jansen (1996), which considers stochastic discounting with period discounting
shocks independent from the history of the game. Related work concerning
stochastic interest rates can be found in the theory of finance, see Ross (1976),
Harrison and Kreps (1979), and Hansen and Richard (1987).
This thesis studies repeated games with pure strategies and common stochas-
tic discounting under perfect information. We consider infinite repetitions of
any finite normal form game possessing at least one pure Nash action pro-
file. We require the stochastic discounting process to to satisfy the following:
(1) Markov property, (2) Martingale property, (3)to have bounded increments
(across time) and to possess a denumerable state space with a rich ergodic
subset, (4) there are states of the stochastic discounting process that are ar-
bitrarily close to 0, and such states can be reached with positive (yet possibly
arbitrarily small) probability in the long run. In this setting, we, not only es-
tablish the (subgame perfect) Folk Theorem, but also prove the main result of
this study: Under any subgame perfect equilibrium strategy, the occurrence of
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any finite number of consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile,
must almost surely happen within a finite time window. That is, any equilib-
rium strategy almost surely contains arbitrary long realizations of consecutive
period Nash action profiles. In other words, every equilibrium outcome path
almost surely involves a stage, i.e. the stochastic process governing the one–
shot discount factor possesses a stopping time, after which long consecutive
repetitions of the period Nash action profile must be observed. Considering
the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with pure strategies and stochastic discount-
ing, our results display that: (1) the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds;
and, (2) in any subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for any natural num-
ber K, the occurrence of K consecutive defection action profiles must happen
almost surely within a finite time period.
The fundamental reason of our main result is captured by a significant
phrase to be found on page 101 of Williams (1991): “Whatever always stands
a reasonable chance of happening, will almost surely happen – sooner rather
than later.” Indeed, due to the restrictions on the stochastic processes we
prove that for any ε > 0, the one–shot discount factor must fall below ε in
a finite time period almost surely. Then, given any natural number K, the
restriction of bounded increments enable us to identify the level of ε (via the
use of K) so that: In any equilibrium path, the one–shot discount factors
cannot exceed a certain threshold even when K+1 consecutive “good” shocks
are realized. Hence, the occurrence of K consecutive repetitions of the period
Nash action profile, must almost surely happen within a finite time window
under any subgame perfect strategy.
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In order to see why the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds, first, no-
tice that due to restricting attention to perfect information and stochastic
processes with the Markov property, given any history of shocks, players eval-
uate future payoffs with their expected discount factors and the conclusions
of Abreu (1988) applies. Moreover, we show that the following observation
holds regarding players’ expectations for future discount factors: In any pe-
riod t with any given history of shocks up to that period, each player evaluates
future return streams at least as much as a player using a constant discount
factor obtained from the same shocks. That is, each player’s expectation of
the discount factor from period t into period τ , τ > t, is not less than the
discount factor from t into t+1 raised to the power of τ − (t+1). Hence, one
may approximate a given strictly individually rational payoff vector by con-
structing a simple strategy profile (supporting that payoff vector via period–0
expectations) and working with its extensions to our setting.
The literature on stochastic discounting in repeated games is surprisingly
not very rich. A significant contribution in that field is Baye and Jansen
(1996). Their study considers a form of stochastic discounting with no strin-
gent restrictions on the values that one–shot discount factor can take, and,
the distribution of one–shot discount factors may depend on the time index.
However, such a distribution in a particular period is independent from the
past distributions. Moreover, they identify two significant cases: The first,
when the one–shot discount factor is realized before the actions in the stage
game are undertaken; the second, when the actions need to be chosen before
the one–shot discount factor is realized. They prove that the Folk Theorem
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holds with in the latter case. They also establish that in the first case, “a full
folk theorem is unobtainable... since average payoffs on the efficiency frontier
are unobtainable as Nash equilibrium super–game payoffs”.
Our formulation involves the stochastic discount level in a period t, δt+1t ,
being common knowledge among the players in period t before they choose ac-
tions. Thus, apart from the beginning of the game our formulation corresponds
to the case in Baye and Jansen (1996) where “... players choose actions in each
period after having observed the current discount factor”. In this setting, as
was mentioned above, they show that the (full) Folk Theorem “...breaks down;
payoffs on the boundary of the set of individually rational payoffs are unob-
tainable as Nash equilibrium average payoffs to the supergame.” However, it
is important to emphasize the following: (1) Their stochastic discounting for-
mulation involves a common discount factor determined by a random variable
distributed independently from the history of the game; and (2) While our
formulation necessitates (due to the use of stochastic processes) the period 0
discount factor to be deterministic, the failure of the Folk Theorem shown in
the setting of Baye and Jansen (1996) is primarily due to the action profile
chosen in period 0 being a function of the random period 0 discount factor
(drawn before the period 0 action is chosen).
There is a number of notable contributions in the context of stochas-
tic games. Indeed, recent studies by Fudenberg and Yamamato (2010) and
Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2010) generalize the Folk Theorem of
Dutta (1995) for irreducible stochastic games with the requirement of a finite
state space. Our setup can be expressed as an irreducible stochastic game
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where each players’ discounting is constant, yet their payoffs are all obtained
from a (stochastic) scalar, and the actions chosen have no bearing on the fu-
ture payoffs. Indeed, ours is a particular irreducible stochastic game with an
infinitely rich state space, hence these Folk Theorems do not apply.
It is important to point out that the two theorems presented in this study
are two distinct observations. The first concerns the inevitable state that the
stochastic discount factor must almost surely reach in far future; the reasons
why the inevitable state that the stochastic discount factor must almost surely
reach in far future is not reflected in date zero evaluations of future payoffs, are
the martingale property and the linearity of players payoff functions. There-
fore, the first result should not be interpreted as an “Anti–Folk Theorem”.
It displays that when players use stochastic discounting, one should not be
surprised to observe long consecutive repetitions of Nash behavior in the far
yet foreseeable future, no matter how patient players were in the initial stages
of the repeated interaction.
On the other hand the second theorem in our study concerns state contin-
gent plans of actions, formulated and evaluated with the information available
at date zero. Therefore the small possibilities of future shocks do not impact
the expected returns evaluated at the beginning. In other words our Folk The-
orem says that when players are sufficiently patient at the beginning of the
game (they are expected to be just as patient in the future due to martingale
property) any strictly individual payoff vector can be approximately obtained
(with date zero expectations) under subgame perfection. 1
1This Folk Theorem is one that concerns a special class of irreducible stochastic games
with infinitely many states.
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The organization of this chapter is as follows: The next section will present
the basic model, notation and definitions and, some preliminary yet important
results. In section 2 we characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs and the principle of one deviation. In section 3 we will present and
prove the main theorem of this thesis. Finally, in section 4, we will find an
anology between regular repeated games and their stochastically discounted
brethren, and present our Folk Theorem for repeated games with stochastic
discounting.
4.1 Notations and Definitions
Let G = (N, (Ai, ui)i∈N) be a normal form game with |N | ∈ N and for all
i ∈ N , Ai is player i’s actions with property that |Ai| ∈ N; and i’s payoff
function denoted by ui : A→ R where A =
∏
i∈N Ai and A−i =
∏
j 6=iAi.
For what follows, we assume some structure on the set of actions in G and
also that it has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium:
Assumption 1. G = (N, (Ai, ui)i∈N) is such that there exists a
∗ ∈ A with the
property that for all i ∈ N , ui(a
∗) ≥ ui(ai, a
∗
−i) for all ai ∈ Ai.
For any i ∈ N denote respectively the (pure strategy) minmax payoff and a
(pure strategy)minmax profile for player i by vi = mina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i)
and the associated action profile by mi ∈ argmina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i).
The set of individually rational payoffs is denoted by
U = {u ∈ co (u(A)) : ui ≥ vi for all i ∈ N} ,
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the set of strictly individually rational payoffs by
U0 = {u ∈ co(u(A) : ui > vi for all i ∈ N}.
The supergame of G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G
taking place in periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . . Let N0 = N ∪ {0}.
In every period t ∈ N0, a random variable, dt, is determined. The following
summarizes the assumptions needed, which allows for a wide class of random
variables:
Assumption 2. {dt}t∈N0 is a stochastic process satisfying the following:
1. Markov property;
2. martingale property;
3. the state space Ω of dt, is a subset of (0, 1) with infinitely many elements;
4. given the state space Ω of dt, the set of ergodic states, denoted by Ω
E, is
dense in Ω;
5. dt is such that for any ε > 0, there exists τ ≥ t with Pr (dτ < ε | Ft) > 0;
6. for any given state ω ∈ Ω ⊆ (0, 1), the set of states ω′ ∈ Ω that are
reachable from ω in a single period and satisfying ω < ω′, denoted by
R(ω), is finite. Moreover, for any ω, ω′ ∈ Ω with ω′ > ω, supR(ω′) ≥
supR(ω);
7. d0 is non-stochastic.
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The first two parts of Assumption 2 imply not only that the best guess
about the future depends only on the current value of the stochastic process,
but also that this best guess is equal to the current value.
The third and fourth parts of Assumption 2 imply that the set of values
that are reachable both in the long run and in the short run are large, but
bounded. That is, the set of aperiodic and non-transient states of dt must be
dense in the state space, which is a subset of (0, 1).
In the fifth part of Assumption 2 we require that there are states of the
stochastic process arbitrarily close to 0, and such states can be reached with
positive, but possibly arbitrarily small, probability in the long run. It is es-
sential to note that when the state space of the process is finite, then the fifth
part of our assumption cannot hold.
The sixth part of Assumption 2 requires that the “upward jumps” in the
process cannot involve infinitely many states. This can be considered as a
special form of bounded increments requirement. This is because, due to the
process itself being bounded, the above requirement limits the increments to
be bounded non-trivially at every state.
The final part of Assumption 2 requires that the start of the process is
deterministic.
We wish to point out that the stochastic process known as the normalized
beta-binomial distribution with two dimensions, a Polya’s urn scheme, satisfies
all the requirements of Assumption 2, where the relevant state space Ω is a
subset of rational numbers in (0, 1). To see this we refer the reader to Karlin
and Taylor (1975).
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Given a stochastic process {dt}t∈N, let {Ft}t∈N0 denote its natural filtration
(i.e. sequence of growing σ-algebras); and for any given t ∈ N0, Ft is commonly
interpreted as the information in period t.
Given τ , we let a particular realization of the stochastic process {dt}t∈N be
denoted by dτ ∈ R.
The supergame is defined for a given d ∈ (0, 1) with d = rd0 and r ∈ (0, 1],
and is denoted by G({dt}t).
2 For k ≥ 1, a k−stage history is a k-length
sequence hk = ((a0, d1), . . . , (ak−1, dk)), where, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1, at ∈ A;
and for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, dt is realization of dt; the space of all k-length histories
is Hk, i.e., Hk = (A× R)
k. We use e for the unique 0–stage history — it is a
0–length history that represents the beginning of the supergame. The set of
all histories is defined by H =
⋃∞
n=0Hn. For every h ∈ H we let ℓ(h) denote
the length of h. For t ≥ 2, we let dt = (d1, . . . , dt) denote the history of shocks
up to and including period t.
We assume that players have complete information. That is, in period
t > 0, knowing the history up to period t, given by ht, the players make
simultaneous moves denoted by at,i ∈ Ai. The players’ choices in the unique
0–length history e are in A as well. Notice that in our setting, given t, a
player not only observes all the previous action profiles, but also all the shocks
including the ones realized in period t. In other words, the period–t shocks
are commonly observed before making a choice in period t.
For all i ∈ N , a strategy for player i is a function fi : H → Ai mapping
2The reason why we have chosen to formulate d ∈ (0, 1) as a multiplication of a real
number r in (0, 1] and d0 is as follows: The stochastic process at hand may involve states
spaces that are strict subsets of (0, 1). Hence, for obtaining d precisely, a multiplication
with a real number in (0, 1] might be necessary.
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histories into actions. The set of player i’s strategies is denoted by Fi, and
F =
∏
i∈N Fi is the joint strategy space. Finally, a strategy vector is f =
(f1, . . . , fn). Given an individual strategy fi ∈ Fi and a history h ∈ H we
denote the individual strategy induced at h by fi|h. This strategy is defined
point-wise on H : (fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h · h¯), for every h¯ ∈ H . We will use (f |h) to
denote (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f ∈ F and h ∈ H . We let Fi(fi) = {fi|h :
h ∈ H} and F (f) = {f |h : h ∈ H}.
A strategy f ∈ F induces an outcome π(f) as follows: π0(f) = f(e) ∈
A; and for d1 ∈ R we have π
1(f)(d1) = f(f(e), d1) ∈ A; and, π
2(f)(d2) =
f(f(e), f(f(e), d1), d2) ∈ A, d1, d2 ∈ R; and continuing in this fashion for all
k > 1 and d1, . . . , dk ∈ R, we obtain
πk(f)(dk) = f
(
π0(f), π1(f)(d1), . . . , πk−1(f)(dk−1), dk
)
∈ A.
On the other hand, the repeated game with common and constant dis-
counting, with a discount factor δˆ ∈ (0, 1), is denoted by G¯(δˆ). We employ
the above definitions, of course, without the parts concerning the stochastic
discounting process.
Next, we wish to present the construction of expected payoffs. Due to
that regard, first we will present our stochastic discounting construction, and
second formulate the resulting expected utilities.
Players payoffs are evaluated with a common stochastic discount factor:
The stochastic discount factor of any player i, i ∈ N , is a random variable, de-
noted by
{
dt+1t
}
t∈N0
, where for any given t ∈ N0, d
t+1
t identifies the probability
of the game continuing from period t to period t + 1. Hence, the stochastic
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discount factor from period t to period τ , with τ ≥ t, given Fs, s ≤ t, is de-
fined by dτt ≡ r
∏τ−1
s=t ds, for some r ∈ (0, 1] with the convention that d
t
t = 1.
This trivially implies that dt+1t ≡ rdt. We denote E(d
t+1
t | Fs) for s ≤ t − 1,
by Es
(
dt+1t
)
, which indeed is the projection of dt+1t on Fs. For any t ∈ N0,
we let a realization of dt+1t be denoted by δ
t+1
t , which stands for the realized
probability that the game continues from period t to period t+ 1.
One thing to note is the particular timing and information setting that
we employ: Given rd0 = d the stochastic discount factor determining the
probability that the game continues into the next period is pinned down to a
constant, d10 = rd0 = d. In the next period, t = 1, d1 is realized before players
decide on a1 ∈ A. So the realization of rd1 = d
2
1 is also known at t = 1. Thus,
following an inductive argument in any period t > 1, the given dt determines
the particular level of δt+1t , i.e. the probability that the game continues from
period t into period t+ 1.
The following Lemma display that the stochastic discounting process con-
structed in this study involves weaker discounting than the one associated with
constant discounting:
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumption 2 is satisfied. Then
1. every possible realization of dτt is in (0, 1) for every τ, t ∈ N0 with τ > t,
2. E
(
dt+1t |F0
)
= δ(0) for some δ(0) ∈ (0, 1) and for all t ∈ N0,
3. for every given δˆ ∈ (0, 1), there exists d ∈ R such that δ(0) = δˆ,
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4. for every τ, t, s ∈ N0 with τ > t ≥ s, given d
t+1
t = δ
t+1
t
E
(
dτ+1τ |Ft
)
= δt+1t , (4.1)
and
E
(
dτt+1|Fs
)
≥
(
E
(
dt+2t+1|Fs
))τ−(t+1)
. (4.2)
The implications of this Lemma are essential for the proof, the interpreta-
tion and the evaluation of our results:
The first one displays that the stochastic process specified results in a
well-defined construction for stochastic discounting. This is because for every
τ, t ∈ N0 with τ > t, d
τ
t = r
∏τ−1
s=t ds is in (0, 1) which is due to r ∈ (0, 1] and
every possible realization of ds for every s ∈ N0 being in (0, 1).
The second shows that date zero expectations of future one–period discount
factors are constant with respect to the time index.
And the third, displays that d can be chosen so that any given constant
discount factor can be precisely obtained. In fact, we wish to point out that
the reason for using a real number r ∈ (0, 1] in the definition given by dτt ≡
r
∏τ−1
s=t ds (and not simply letting r = 1) is that our construction does not
necessarily require the stochastic processes to have a support consisting the
entirety of (0, 1). Particularly, the Polya’s urn scheme, employed later in the
paper as an example, requires d0 to be a rational number in (0, 1). Therefore,
when dealing with stochastic processes requiring Ω 6= (0, 1), for any δˆ ∈ (0, 1)\
Ω, r ∈ (0, 1] and ωˆ ∈ Ω can be identified such that r is sufficiently close to 1
and δˆ = rωˆ. Thus, without loss of generality we assume r = 1 in the rest of
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this study.
Using the first three results presented in the above Lemma, we conclude
with respect to date zero expectations the repeated game at hand can be
associated with one having a constant and common discount factor. Thus, our
repeated game with stochastic discounting can be interpreted as a perturbation
of a “standard” repeated game under perfect information with common and
constant discount factor (given by δˆ).
Finally, the fourth implication of Lemma 1 is twofold: Given any history
of shocks up to time period t, the first is that the expected level of future one–
period discount factors are equal to the current one. The second shows that
every player values future returns more than a player using a constant discount
factor obtained from the same shocks. That is, a player discounts a return
in period τ , τ > t, with Et (d
τ
t ) which is greater or equal to
(
Et
(
dt+1t
))τ−t
.
(Notice that given dt, Et (d
τ
t ) = δ
t+1
t Et
(
dτt+1
)
, because dt+1t = δ
t+1
t is realized.)
In particular, this implies d can be chosen so that
E0 (d
τ
t ) ≥
(
E0
(
dt+1t
))τ−t
=
(
δ(0)
)τ−t
= δˆτ−t,
and when τ = t + 1 then this inequality holds with an equality. Hence, these
properties establish that with a date 0 point of view, our stochastic discounting
construction involves weaker discounting than that associated with a constant
and common discount factor.
The following Remark summarizes these observations:
Remark 1. Given any repeated game under perfect information and a common
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and constant discount factor δˆ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a repeated game under
perfect information and stochastic discounting with a process specified such that
Assumption 2 holds and the perturbed game exhibits the following properties:
(1) The date zero expectations of the one–shot discount factors are all equal
to δˆ; and (2) in date 0 players employ weaker discounting than that associated
with a constant and common discount factor δˆ; and (3) expected level of future
one–period discount factors are equal to the current one.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proofs of parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Lemma are already
discussed above. The first part of the fourth result is, in fact, the martingale
identity. For the second part, notice that
E
(
d
τ
t+1|Ft
)
= rE
(
τ∏
s=t+1
ds|Ft
)
= rE (dt+1E (dt+2 . . .E (dτ−1|Fτ−1) . . .|Ft+1)|Ft)
≥ rE
(
(dt+1)
(τ−(t+1))|Ft
)
≥
(
E
(
d
t+2
t+1|Ft
))τ−(t+1)
due to the tower property (see Williams (1991)), the martingale identity and
the Jensen’s inequality.
The next Assumption is about how players’ employ knowledge of the past
when taking expectations:
Assumption 3. In every period t ∈ N0, each player uses the most up to date
information, i.e. Ft.
Given a strategy profile f , because that each period’s supremum return is
bounded for every player, the payoff of player i ∈ N in the supergame G({dt}t)
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of G is, where d = δˆ ∈ (0, 1):
Ui(f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)u1
(
π0(f)
)
+(1− δˆ)E
(
δ10u1
(
π1(f)(d1)
)
|F0
)
+(1− δˆ)E
(
E
(
δ20u1
(
π2(f)(d2)
)
|F1
)
|F0
)
+(1− δˆ)E
(
E
(
E
(
δ30u2
(
π3(f)(d3)
)
|F2
)
|F1
)
|F0
)
+ . . . .
Because that {Fs}s=0,1,,2,... is the natural filtration, the above term reduces to
Ui(f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)u1
(
π0(f)
)
+(1− δˆ)E
(
δ10u1
(
π1(f)(d1)
)
|F0
)
+(1− δˆ)E
(
δ20u1
(
π2(f)(d2)
)
|F0
)
+(1− δˆ)E
(
δ30u1
(
π3(f)(d3)
)
|F0
)
+ . . . ,
i.e.
Ui(f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=0
E
(
δk0u1
(
πk(f)(dk)
)
|F0
)
, (4.3)
where π0(f)(d0) = π(f(e)), and recall that E (δtt|Fs) = 1 for all s ≤ t. Follow-
ing a similar method, we can also define the continuation utility of player i as
follows: Given t ∈ N and dt ∈ Rt for τ ≥ t
V τ,d
t
i (f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=τ
E
(
δkτui
(
πk(f)(dk)
)
|Ft
)
. (4.4)
We use the convention that V 0,d
0
i (f, {dt}t) = Ui(f, {dt}t).
When attention is restricted to G¯(δˆ), i.e. the repeated game with con-
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stant discounting, the payoffs are defined as follows: For any strategy f¯
of the repeated game G¯(δˆ), the payoff of player i is given by U¯i(f¯ , δˆ) =
(1−δˆ)
∑∞
t=0 δˆ
tui(π¯
t(f¯)), where π¯(f¯) ∈ A∞ is the outcome path of G¯(δˆ) induced
by f¯ . For any π¯ ∈ A∞, t ∈ N0, and i ∈ N , let V¯
t
i (π¯, δˆ) = (1−δˆ)
∑∞
r=t δˆ
r−tui(π¯r)
be the continuation payoff of player i at date t if the outcome path π¯ is played.
4.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
A strategy vector f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium of G({dt}t) if for all i ∈ N ,
Ui(f, {dt}t) ≥ Ui((fˆi, f−i), {dt}t) for all fˆi ∈ Fi. A strategy vector f ∈ F is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame G({dt}t) if every f
′ ∈ F (f) is
a Nash equilibrium. We denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium strate-
gies of G({dt}t) by SPE(G({dt}t)). Let V ({dt}t) be the subgame perfect
equilibrium payoffs of G({dt}t). We will abuse notation and will let V ({dt}t)
denoted by V (d) where d = d0. Moreover, V ({dt}t, τ) are the subgame per-
fect equilibrium continuation payoffs (in period τ terms), when dτ is realized.
In fact, abusing notation we let V ({dt}t, τ) = V(δ
τ+1
τ ).
Moreover, when attention is restricted to the repeated game with con-
stant discounting, G¯(δˆ), subgame perfection can easily be defined by excluding
stochastic parts of the above definitions. We denote the set of subgame per-
fect strategies in G¯(δˆ) by SPE(G¯(δˆ)). Let V¯(δˆ) be the set of subgame perfect
equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game with constant discount factor δˆ.
Letting d = d0 = δˆ below we will show that for every t and d
t, V(δt+1t )
is compact, hence obtain the following characterization analogous to Abreu
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(1988): A strategy f is subgame perfect if and only if for all i ∈ N and for all
t ∈ N0 and for all d
t ∈ Rt, we have
V t,d
t
i (f, {dt}t) ≥ (1− δˆ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, π
t
−i(f)(d
t)) + δt+1t E
(
vi(d
t+1)|Ft
)
, (4.5)
where δt+1t = d
t+1
t (i.e. given d
t, the realization of dt+1t is equal to δ
t+1
t ), and
for every i ∈ N
vi(d
t+1) = min
{
ui : ui ∈ V(δ
t+2
t+1)
}
. (4.6)
Before the justification of these, we wish to describe the resulting construc-
tion briefly. Notice that, when player i decides whether or not to follow the
equilibrium behavior in period t given the history of process dt, it must be
that: The player i’s expected continuation payoff associated with the equi-
librium behavior must be as high as player i deviating singly and optimally
today, and being punished tomorrow. An important issue to notice is that,
tomorrow players will know dt+1 (thus, δ
t+2
t+1) before deciding on their actions.
Thus, players will be punishing player i, the deviator, with the most severe
and credible punishment with the information they have in period t+1. Thus,
the punishment payoff to player i with the information that players have in
period t + 1, i.e. dt+1, is vi(d
t+1). Player i forecasts these in period t, and
hence, forms an expectation regarding his punishment payoff (starting from
period t+1 onwards) with the information that he has in period t, namely dt.
In order to show that for every t and dt, V(δt+1t ) is compact, we will be
employing the construction of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), and it is
important to point out that their assumptions, 1 – 5 are all satisfied in our
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framework: A2, A3, and A4 are trivially satisfied as the period payoffs are
deterministic, and we also impose A1 and A5.
Following their construction, given dt for any W ⊂ RN and the result-
ing level of δt+1t ∈ (0, 1), let g(δ
t+1
t ) be the expected discounted continuation
utility vector (not including today’s payoff levels and using the normaliza-
tion via δˆ ∈ (0, 1)) for an arbitrary strategy profile. Furthermore, for that
given level of δt+1t , consider the pair, (g(δ
t+1
t ), a) and define E(g(δ
t+1
t ), a) =
δt+1t
(
(1− δˆ)u(a) + g(δt+2t+1)
)
. A pair (g(δt+1t ), a) is called admissible with re-
spect to W if E(gi(δ
t+1
t ), a) ≥ E
(
gi(δ
t+1
t ), (γi, a−i)
)
for all γi ∈ Ai and for
all i ∈ N . Moreover, for each set W , define Bd
t
(W ) as follows Bd
t
(W ) =
{E(g(δt+1t ), a)|(g(δ
t+1
t ), a) is admissible w.r.t W}. Any set that satisfies W ⊂
Bd
t
(W ) is called self-generating at dt. At this point it is useful to recall that
V(δt+1t ) = {V
t,dt(f, {dt}t)| f is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile}.
Notice that
g(δt+1t ) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=t+1
E
(
δkt u
(
πk(f)(dk)
)
|Ft
)
,
for some strategy profile f . Furthermore since, δt+1t is actually realized before
the actions are taken and the multiplicative nature of our discount factor, the
above equation becomes
g(δt+1t ) = (1− δˆ)δ
t+1
t
[
u
(
πt+1(f)(dt)
)
+
∞∑
k=t+2
E
(
δkt u
(
πk(f)(dk)
)
|Ft
)]
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which is equal to
g(δt+1t ) = δ
t+1
t
[
(1− δˆ)u
(
πt+1(f)(dt)
)
+ g(δt+2t+1)
]
. (4.7)
Now, it is easy to see that V(δt+1t ) is self-generating, as the pair, (g(δ
t+1
t ),
πt+1(f)(dt)) is admissible with respect to V(δt+1t ) whenever f is a subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy profile with
V t,d
t
(f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)u(at) + g(δ
t+1
t ), (4.8)
where at = π
t(f)(dt−1). The two further points to notice is that, due to lemma
1 of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), Bd
t
(W ) is compact whenever W
is compact, and the operator Bd
t
is monotone. Furthermore, since V(δt+1t )
is bounded (by (1/1 − δt+1t )U), closure of V(δ
t+1
t ), denoted by cl(V(δ
t+1
t ))
is compact. Hence, Bd
t
(cl(V(δt+1t ))) is compact, and due to cl(V(δ
t+1
t )) ⊂
Bd
t
(cl(V(δt+1t ))) and self-generation cl(V(δ
t+1
t )) ⊂ V(δ
t+1
t ). Thus, by Theorem
2 of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), Bd
t
(V(δt+1t )) = V(δ
t+1
t ), thus V(δ
t+1
t )
is compact.
4.3 Inevitability of Nash behavior
In this section, we wish to present the main result of this study:
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold. Then, for every K ∈ N, for
every δˆ ∈ (0, 1), for every stochastic discounting process {dt}t with d0 = δˆ, and
for every subgame perfect strategy profile f of the repeated game with stochastic
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discounting; there exists T which is almost surely in N0, and the probability of
πτ (f) being a Nash equilibrium action profile of the stage game conditional on
the information available at s, equals 1, for all s = T, . . . , T + K and for all
τ = s, . . . , T +K.
The above theorem establishes that when Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold,
then arbitrary long (yet, finite) consecutive repetitions of the period Nash
action profile must almost surely happen in a finite time window no matter
which subgame perfect equilibrium strategy is considered and no matter how
high the initial discount factor is. That is, any equilibrium strategy almost
surely entails arbitrary long consecutive observations of the period Nash action
profile.
Showing this result involves 2 steps: The first displays that every subgame
perfect strategy must involve the prescription of the Nash behavior whenever
the current discount factor is sufficiently small. The second displays that for
any given level of the initial discount factor and any given natural number
K, the stochastic process governing the one–shot discount factors possesses a
stopping time, after which the return to some sufficiently high level of one–shot
discount rates within a K–period time window, has zero probability with the
evaluation being made in any period within that time window.
The Proof of Theorem 1. The result follows from Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold. Then, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1)
such that for all δt+1t ≤ δ, t ∈ N0, every subgame perfect strategy profile f of
G({dt}) must be such that f(d
t, at) ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of G.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the subgame perfect strategy f
is such that
(
maxai∈Ai ui(ai, π
t
−i(f)(d
t))− ui(π
t(f)(dt))
)
> 0 for some t ∈ N0
and for some dt and for some i ∈ N . Because otherwise, the strategy is
resulting in a repetition of period Nash behavior. Then, by equation 4.5, for
any such subgame perfect strategy f and i and t and dt
δt+1t
(
V
t+1,dt
i − E
(
vi(d
t+1)|Ft
))
≥ (1−δˆ)
(
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, π
t
−i(f)(d
t))− ui(π
t(f)(dt))
)
.
Both the left and the right hand sides of this inequality are strictly positive.
Yet, when the prescribed action is not a Nash equilibrium of G, then the left
hand side converges to 0 when δt+1t tends to 0, but the right hand side is
constant.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold. Then, for every δ ∈ (0, 1),
for every K ∈ N, for every δˆ ∈ (0, 1), and for every stochastic discounting
process {dt}t with δˆ = d0; there exists T which is almost surely in N0 and
Pr [dτ+1τ < δ | Fs] = 1, for every s = T, . . . , T +K and τ = s, . . . , T +K.
Proof. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and K ∈ N and δˆ ∈ (0, 1) with δˆ = d0. Let ω0 ∈
{ω ∈ ΩE : ω < δ} 6= ∅ due to part (4) and (5) of Assumption 2. Consider
ω1 ∈ Ω
E with ω0 ≥ maxR(ω1), and such an ω1 exists due to part (4), (5) and
(6) of Assumption 2. 3 Now, define ω2 ∈ Ω
E that satisfies ω1 ≥ maxR(ω2).
Inductively, for a given ωK−1 ∈ Ω
E define ωK ∈ Ω
E likewise. Again notice
that due to Assumption 2 such an ωK exists.
3Recall that for any given state ω ∈ Ω ⊆ (0, 1), the set of states ω′ ∈ Ω that are reachable
from ω in a single period and satisfying ω < ω′, denoted by R(ω).
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Following Karlin and Taylor (1975), define the following event
ζ ≡ min{τ ∈ N0 : dτ ≤ ωK}.
Then by construction, it must be that Pr [ds+k ≥ δ | Fs] = 0, for all s =
ζ, . . . , ζ +K and k = 0, . . . , K − s. Finally, due to the ergodicity of ωK , ζ is a
stopping time, that is it will almost surely happen in a finite time period, i.e.
Pr [ζ <∞] = 1. Hence, ζ is almost surely in N0 with Pr [ds+k < δ | Fs] = 1
for all s = ζ, . . . , ζ +K and k = 0, . . . , K − s. Indeed, this also implies that ζ
is almost surely in N0 with Eτ (δ
τ+1
τ ) < δ for every τ = ζ, . . . , ζ +K.
4.4 The Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem
In this section we prove the following subgame perfect Folk Theorem for re-
peated games with stochastic discounting.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold, and either dim(U) = n or
n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
u ∈ U0 and for all stochastic discounting processes {dt}t∈N0 with δˆ = d0 ≥ δ,
there exists a subgame perfect strategy f of G({dt}t) such that ‖U (f, {dt}t)−
u‖ < ε.
In order to establish this result, an analogy between repeated games with
stochastic discounting and those with constant discounting is constructed as
follows: Given any repeated game with stochastic discounting, we consider the
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repeated game with a constant discount factor that equals the initial level of
the stochastic discounting process. Particularly, in the repeated game with
constant discounting we concentrate on strictly enforceable strategies, those
to which players strictly prefer to conform, in each date and state including
equilibrium and punishment phases. It is useful to remind the reader that due
to the monotonicity result of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), Theorem
6, such strategies are strictly enforceable for higher discount factors as well.
Formulating an extension of such a strategy and requiring it to be subgame
perfect in the repeated game with stochastic discounting, turns out to be an
arduous, yet feasible (as proven in Lemma 4), endeavor whenever the initial
level of the stochastic discounting is sufficiently high.
To see the difficulties involved, consider a repeated prisoners’ dilemma, with
actions Ai = {c, d} and u1(d, c) = u2(c, d) > ui(c, c) >
1
2
(u1(c, d) + u2(c, d)) >
ui(d, d) > u1(c, d) = u2(d, c), i = 1, 2. Clearly, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
the cooperative payoff (hence, path given by ((c, c);∞)) is sustained with a
strictly enforceable strategy profile for all δ > δ. Now, consider any stochastic
discounting process satisfying our restrictions and possessing a sufficiently high
initial level, and any strategy such that its utility (evaluated at the beginning
of the game) is arbitrarily close to (ui(c, c))i=1,2. Due to Lemma 2, for any
realizations of the one-shot discount factor that is strictly below δ, any such
strategy must dictate the play of (d, d), if it were to be subgame perfect. Thus,
any subgame perfect strategy in the repeated game with stochastic discounting
sustaining the cooperative payoff must be contingent on the realizations of the
one-shot discount factors. A simple formulation is one where this contingency
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is represented by a date and state independent threshold, δ∗ ≥ δ, so that:
the play continues on the cooperative path as long as every past realization
of the one-shot discount factors is above δ∗; and otherwise, the play switches
to the defection phase. Then, the verification of subgame perfection in the
repeated game with stochastic discounting calls for checking every subgame,
in particular, those with the current one-shot discount factor arbitrarily close,
yet, strictly exceeding δ∗. In such a subgame where additionally there have
not been any single player deviations in the past and all past one-shot discount
factors have been above δ∗, this strategy should call for the play of (c, c). How-
ever, it is not subgame perfect whenever the following holds: The stochastic
discounting process is one where the probability of the next period’s one-shot
discount factor being strictly less than δ∗, is high enough such that any one of
the players finds it profitable to deviate in the current period.
Therefore, given a strictly enforceable strategy in the repeated game with
constant discounting, the extended strategy we employ is contingent on the
stochastic discounting process in the following manner: It will prescribe the
play to continue on the paths dictated by its counterpart in the repeated game
with constant discounting, whenever each of the past realizations of the one-
shot discount factors exceeds a date and state specific threshold. Otherwise,
our strategy will recommend the play to consist of the repetitions of a Nash
action profile of the stage game thereafter. The initial level of the stochastic
discounting process can be chosen sufficiently high so that we can construct
date and state specific thresholds such that, given a date and state, the proba-
bility (evaluated in that date and state) of the one-shot discount factor in the
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next period falling below its associated threshold, is sufficiently low. This and
strict enforceability, in turn, imply that the relevant incentive conditions hold
for any date and state. Meanwhile, choosing the initial level of the stochastic
discounting process to be sufficiently high, also results in the utility (evaluated
at the beginning of the game) of this strategy profile in the repeated game with
stochastic discounting to be arbitrarily close to the utility of its counterpart
in the game with the constant discount factor given by that initial level.
Finally, our result is obtained by combining the above construction and the
observation that when restricted to pure actions, the strategy profile in the
proof of the subgame perfect Folk Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1991)
is, in fact, strictly enforceable.
The rest of this section presents the details about the proof of Theorem 2.
Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then, for any δˆ ∈ (0, 1), consider
the repeated game with stochastic discounting G({dt}t) with d0 = δˆ; and,
the repeated game with constant discounting G¯(δˆ). For any k−stage history
hk = ((a0, d1), . . . , (ak−1, dk)) of G({dt}t) where for all 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1, at ∈ A,
and for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, dt is realization of dt, define its deterministic counterpart,
a k−stage history, in G¯(δˆ) by h¯k = (a0, . . . , ak−1).
Following Abreu (1988), it is well known that one may restrict attention
to simple strategies in the analysis of subgame perfection in repeated games
with constant discounting: f¯ in G¯(δ), δ ∈ (0, 1) is a simple strategy profile
represented by n + 1 paths (π¯(0), π¯(1), . . . , π¯(n)) if f¯ specifies: (i) play π¯(0) un-
til some player deviates singly from π¯(0); (ii) for any j ∈ N , play π¯(j) if the
jth player deviates singly from π¯(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, where π¯(i) is the ongoing
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previously specified path; (iii) continue with the ongoing specified path π¯(i),
i = 0, 1, . . . , n, if no deviations occur or if two or more players deviate simul-
taneously. These strategies are simple because the play of the game is always
in only (n + 1) states, namely, in state j ∈ {0, . . . , n} where π¯(j),t is played,
for some t ∈ N0. In this case, we say that the play is in phase t of state j.
A profile (π¯(0), π¯(1), . . . , π¯(n)) of n+ 1 outcome paths is subgame perfect if the
simple strategy represented by it is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Moreover,
following Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), we say that a simple strat-
egy f¯ in G¯(δ), δ ∈ [0, 1), is weakly enforceable if for all i ∈ N and for all
j ∈ {0, 1, .., n} and for all t ∈ N0
V¯ ti (π¯
(j), δ) ≥ (1− δ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, π¯
(j),t
−i ) + δV¯i(π¯
(i), δ), (4.9)
where (π¯(0), π¯(1), . . . , π¯(n)) is the simple strategy associated with f¯ . Due to
Abreu (1988), we know that a simple strategy f¯ ∈ SPE(G¯(δ)) if and only if
f¯ in G¯(δ) is weakly enforceable. Moreover, we say that a simple strategy f¯ in
G¯(δ) with associated outcome paths (π¯(0), π¯(1) . . . , π¯(n)) is strictly enforceable
if for all i ∈ N and for all j ∈ {0, 1, .., n} and for all t ∈ N0
inf
i,j,t
(
V¯ ti (π¯
(j), δ)−
(
(1− δ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, π¯
(j),t
−i ) + δV¯i(π¯
(i), δ)
))
> 0 (4.10)
Let f¯ be a strictly enforceable simple strategy in G¯(δ), δ ∈ (0, 1), and
the profile of outcome paths associated be (π¯(0), π¯(1), . . . , π¯(n)). Now, let us
formulate an analogy between G({dt}t) with d0 = δˆ and G¯(δˆ) for δˆ ≥ δ.
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold, and f¯ of G¯(δ), where
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δ ∈ (0, 1) and the associated outcome paths are (π¯(0), π¯(1), . . . , π¯(n)), is a strictly
enforceable simple strategy. Then, for all η > 0 there exists δ∗ ∈ (δ, 1) such
that for all δˆ > δ∗ there is f in G({dt}t) with d0 = δˆ, with the properties that
f is subgame perfect in G({dt}t) and
∥∥∥U (f, {dt}t)− U¯ (f¯ , δˆ)∥∥∥ < η.
Proof. Let ν∗ be defined by
ν∗ ≡ inf
i,j,t
(
V¯ ti (π¯
(j), δ)−
(
(1− δ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, π¯
(j),t
−i ) + δV¯i(π¯
(i), δ)
))
> 0,
and consider ν > 0 with ν < min{ν∗, η}. Then, there exists δν > δ and
pν ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently close to 0 such that the following conditions hold: For
all i ∈ N , j ∈ N ∪ {0}, t ∈ N0
∥∥∥δν V¯ t+1i (π¯(j), δν)− (δν((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (π¯(j), δν) + pν V¯ t+1i (a∗, δν)))∥∥∥ < ν6 (4.11)
inf
i,j,t
[
(1− δν)ui(π¯
(j),t) + δν((1− pν)V¯
t+1
i (π¯
(j), δν) + pνV¯
t+1
i (a
∗, δν))
− ((1− δν) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, π¯
(j),t
−i ) + δν
(
(1− pν)V¯
t+1
i (π¯
(i), δν) + pν V¯
t+1
i (a
∗, δν)
)]
> ν (4.12)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
t=0
E0
(
δt0
) (
ui
(
π¯(j),t(f¯)
))
−
∞∑
t=0
δtν
(
ui
(
π¯(j),t(f¯)
))∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 . (4.13)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
t=0
E0
(
δt0
)
(ui (a
∗))−
∞∑
t=0
δtν (ui (a
∗))
∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 . (4.14)
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Condition 4.11 holds trivially. On the other hand, condition 4.12 holds be-
cause f¯ is strict enforceable at δ, and the monotonicity result, Theorem 6 of
Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), implies that f¯ ∈ SPE(G¯(δ′)) for any
δ′ ≥ δ. Indeed, it can easily be verified (by using the same techniques of the
proof of this result) that f¯ is also strictly enforceable at δ′ ≥ δ. Furthermore,
since pν can be selected arbitrarily close to 0, the associated slack (the left
hand side of condition 4.12, which converges to ν∗ when pν tends to 0) can be
chosen to strictly exceed ν. Moreover, conditions 4.13 and 4.14 are due to the
following: Observe that for any process satisfying Assumption 2 with d0 = δν ,
the fourth part of Lemma 1 and the Sandwich Lemma directly imply that as
δν tends to 1, E (δ
τ
t |F0) tends to (δν)
τ−t for all τ, t ∈ N0 with τ ≥ t. It is
important to point out that because pν can be selected arbitrarily small, all
these conditions, 4.11 – 4.14, keep holding when they are evaluated at pν and
δˆ > δν and d0 = δˆ.
Furthermore, observe that since {dt}t is a non–negative bounded martin-
gale, {et}t defined by et ≡ (1 − dt) for all t ∈ N0 is also a non-negative,
bounded martingale. Using Doob’s Maximal Inequality (we refer the reader
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to Doob (1984)) 4 for this martingale we obtain for any t < T and δ¯ ∈ (0, 1)
(1− δ¯)Pr
[
sup
t≤s≤T
(1− δs+1s ) ≥ (1− δ¯)
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ E
(
(1− δT+1T )|Ft
)
(1− δ¯)Pr
[
inf
t≤s≤T
δs+1s ≤ δ¯
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ E
(
(1− δT+1T )|Ft
)
Pr
[
inf
t≤s≤T
δs+1s ≤ δ¯
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≤
E
(
(1− δT+1T )|Ft
)
(1− δ¯)
.
Moreover, since {dt}t is a martingale the right hand side of the above condition
is constant for all T ∈ N0 and t < T , i.e.
Pr
[
inf
t≤s≤T
δs+1s ≤ δ¯
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≤
1− δt+1t
1− δ¯
. (4.15)
In the following we will inductively construct the set of states in which the
strategy that we will employ in the game with stochastic discounting, would
prescribe the play to continue following f¯ . Consider d0 > δν , and recall that
it is deterministic. Then, let δ¯(1) be such that δ¯(1) ≥ δν and
1− d0
1− δ¯(1)
≤ pν ,
and define
Ω ν(1) =
{
δ ∈ Ω : δ > δν and
1− δ
1− δ¯(1)
≤ pν
}
.
Now, given δ¯(t−1) and Ω
ν
(t−1), define δ¯(t) such that δ¯(t) ≥ δν and for any δ ∈
4Doob’s Maximal Inequality for nonnegative submartingales is as follows: Let {Xt}t∈N0
be a nonnegative submartingale with a filtration {Ft}t∈N0 and ℓ > 0. Then for any T for
any s < T , ℓPr
[
sups≤t≤T Xt ≥ ℓ
∣∣Fs] ≤ E (XT |Fs).
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Ω ν(t−1),
1− δ
1− δ¯(t)
≤ pν ,
and let
Ω ν(t) =
{
δ ∈ Ω : δ > δν and
1− δ
1− δ¯(t)
≤ pν
}
.
Notice that for any history h, with δt+1t ∈ Ω
ν
(t), it must be that δ
t+1
t is not only
strictly above δν , but also, the probability of any one of the future one-shot
discount factors being less than or equal to δ¯(t) is less than or equal to pν . An
important observation is that when d0 is chosen sufficiently high, then Ω
ν
(t) 6= ∅
for all t ∈ N. This follows from the denseness of ΩE (the ergodic set of states)
in Ω following the fourth part of Assumption 2.
The strategy we use as follows: For any history h = (h¯, dt) for some t ∈ N0
with ℓ(h) = ℓ(h¯) = t
f(h) =

 f¯(h¯) if δ
s+1
s ∈ Ω
ν
(s) for all s ≤ t
a∗ otherwise.
(4.16)
In words, this strategy prescribes the continuation along the simple strategy
f¯ whenever the history is one in which the following hold: In any period t, all
realizations of one-shot discount factors up to period t, δs+1s with s ≤ t, have
been such that (1) each one of them is strictly above δν , and (2) the probability
evaluated with date s information of any one of the future one-shot discount
factors, δk+1k with k ≥ s, being less than or equal to δ¯(s) is less than or equal
to pν , s ≤ t. For all other cases, the strategy prescribes the repetitions of the
Nash action profile of the stage game. An interesting observation about this
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strategy f is that it induces the play to be in only (n + 2) states, namely,
(π¯(0), π¯(1), . . . , π¯(n), π∗), where π∗,t = a∗ for all t ∈ N0.
Clearly, this strategy is well defined.
Consider any history h. Below, we will prove that when d0 = δˆ is chosen
sufficiently high, f is Nash in the subgame starting at h, hence, subgame
perfect.
If δs+1s /∈ Ω
ν
(s) for some s ≤ t, f recommends the repetition of a
∗ thereafter.
Hence, is clearly Nash in such subgames.
If δs+1s ∈ Ω
ν
(s) for all s ≤ t, f recommends the continuation of the simple
strategy given by f¯ , which is associated with (π¯(0), π¯(1), . . . , π¯(n)). Then, the
continuation utility, equation 4.4, can be written as follows:
V t,d
t
i (f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
) (
ui
(
πk(f)(dk)
) (
1− ρ
(t)
k
)
+ ui (a
∗) ρ
(t)
k
)
,
(4.17)
where d0 = δˆ and for any k ≥ t,
ρ
(t)
k = 1− Pr
[
δs+1s ∈ Ω
ν
(s), for all s with t ≤ s ≤ k
∣∣Ft] ≤ pν .
Notice that, given h, hence at, (πk(f)(dk)) is equal to some (π¯(j),κ) for some
j ∈ N ∪ {0} and κ, whenever δs+1s ∈ Ω
ν
(s) for all s with t ≤ s ≤ k, an event
which happens with probability 1− ρ(t)k . That is, in such cases the play must
be in some phase of π¯(j) for some j ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Observe that for any process satisfying Assumption 2 (specifically the
Markov property) with d0 = δˆ > δν , condition 4.13 directly implies (recall
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that the history is such that δt+1t > δν for all t, and Et
(
δk+1k
)
= δt+1t , k ≥ t)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
) (
ui
(
π¯k(f¯)
))
−
∞∑
k=t
(
δt+1t
)k (
ui
(
π¯k(f¯)
))∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 . (4.18)
Similarly due to the same reasons, condition 4.14 implies that
∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
)
(ui (a
∗))−
∞∑
k=t
(
δt+1t
)k
(ui (a
∗))
∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 . (4.19)
Conditions 4.13 and 4.14 together with the fact that δt+1t > δν bring about
ν
3
>
∥∥∥∥∥δt+1t ((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (π¯(j), δt+1t ) + pν V¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
−
δt+1t
1− δˆ
(
(1 − pν)
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
) (
ui
(
π¯(j),k(f¯)
))
+ pν
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
)
(ui (a
∗))
)∥∥∥∥∥ .
Now, using condition 4.11 we obtain
ν
2
>
∥∥∥∥∥δt+1t ((1 − pν)V¯ t+1i (π¯(j), δt+1t ) + pν V¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
−
δt+1t
1− δˆ
(
(1− ρ
(t)
t+1)
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
)(
ui
(
π¯(j),k(f¯)
))
+ ρ
(t)
t+1
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
)
(ui (a
∗))
)∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥δt+1t ((1 − pν)V¯ t+1i (π¯(j), δt+1t ) + pν V¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
− δt+1t
(
(1− ρ
(t)
t+1)V
t+1,dt+1
i (f, {dt}t) + ρ
(t)
t+1V
t+1,dt+1
i (a
∗, {dt}t)
)∥∥∥
delivering
ν
2
>
∥∥∥(1− δˆ)ui(π¯(j),t) + δt+1t ((1 − pν)V¯ t+1i (π¯(j), δt+1t ) + pν V¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
− V t,d
t
i (f, {dt}t)
∥∥∥ , (4.20)
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and
ν
2
>
∥∥∥∥(1− δˆ) maxai∈Ai ui(ai, π¯(j),t−i ) + δt+1t ((1 − pν)V¯ t+1i (π¯(i), δt+1t ) + pν V¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
−
(
(1− δˆ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, π¯
(j),t
−i )
+δt+1t
(
(1− ρ
(t)
t+1)V
t+1,dt+1
i (f, {dt}t) + ρ
(t)
t+1V
t+1,dt+1
i (a
∗, {dt}t)
))∥∥∥ , (4.21)
where V t+1,d
t+1
i (f, {dt}t) in condition 4.21, is the continuation payoff of player
i’s punishment path in the stochastic game when δt+2t+1 ∈ Ω
ν
(t+1) (otherwise,
player i’s deviation is followed by the repetitions of the Nash action).
Conditions 4.12, and conditions 4.20 and 4.21 together imply that
V t,d
t
i (f, {dt}t)−
(
(1− δˆ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, π¯
(j),t
−i )
+δt+1t
(
(1− ρ
(t)
t+1)V
t+1,dt+1
i (f, {dt}t) + ρ
(t)
t+1V
t+1,dt+1
i (a
∗, {dt}t)
))
> ν −
ν
2
−
ν
2
= 0,
showing that f is Nash in every subgame that starts with h such that δs+1s ∈
Ω ν(s) for all s ≤ t with ℓ(h) = t.
Thus, f is subgame perfect.
Choose d0 = δˆ > δν such that δˆ ∈ Ω
ν
(1). Then, conditions 4.11, and 4.13
and 4.14 imply
∥∥∥∥∥V 0,d0i (f, {dt}t)− (1− δˆ)
∞∑
t=0
E0
(
δt0
) (
ui
(
π¯t(f¯)
))∥∥∥∥∥ < ν2 ,
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and
∥∥∥∥∥(1− δˆ)
∞∑
t=0
E0
(
δt0
) (
ui
(
π¯t(f¯)
))
− (1− δˆ)
∞∑
t=0
δˆt
(
ui
(
π¯t(f¯)
))∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 .
These, in turn, finishes the proof because of the following conclusion
∥∥∥U (f, {dt}t)− U¯ (f¯ , δˆ)∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥V 0,d0i (f, {dt}t)− U¯ (f¯ , δˆ)∥∥∥ < 46ν < ν < η.
Now, we are ready to present the proof of our subgame perfect Folk The-
orem for repeated games with stochastic discounting:
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of the Folk Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin
(1991) shows that for any u ∈ U0, there exists some δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) and a strictly
enforceable simple strategy f¯ in G¯(δ¯) such that for all δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), U¯(f¯ , δ) = u.
This follows from considering conditions 2 – 4 and 8 in their proof, which
guarantee that each phase of play (which they denote A for the equilibrium,
Bj for the minmax and Cj for the reward phases of j ∈ N) they consider sat-
isfies incentive conditions strictly. Additionally, their strategy becomes simple
and strictly enforceable when attention is restricted to obtaining individually
rational payoffs constructed with the pure strategy minmax.
Hence, Lemma 4 applies and delivers the conclusion that for all η > 0 there
exists δ∗ ∈ (δ¯, 1) such that for all δˆ > δ∗ there is f in G({dt}t) with d0 = δˆ,
such that f is subgame perfect in G({dt}t) and
∥∥∥U (f, {dt}t)− U¯ (f¯ , δˆ)∥∥∥ < η.
Thus, letting η ≤ ε, renders the desired conclusion.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we consider a wide class of games with stochastic discounting
with rich state spaces, when the discounting process is not independent of the
past. In such a setting, we imposed the restriction that players expectation
of the future discount factor is equal to the current one, and only the current
value is relevant when trying to make assertions about the future values of the
discount factor. Under this construction, we not only proved a Folk Theorem
for repeated games with stochastic discounting but we also, showed that no
matter how patient players are every subgame perfect equilibrium path must
entail arbitrarily (yet finite) consecutive repetitions of period Nash behaviour,
and these consecutive periods almost surely happen in a finite time window.
The reason why these seemingly contradictory results appear together is
about the timing. The Folk Theorem involves complete contingent plans of
actions, drafted at the beginning of the game, and the expected results from
such plans again calculated at the beginning of the game. The inevitability
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result on the other hand, concerns observations about the behavior of the
stochastic discounting process in the far, yet almost surely finite future.
It is well worth to investigate this construction with weaker assumptions
on the stochastic process, namely reducing the martingale requirement to a
submartingale requirement. Under such a construction, the evaluation of the
continuation values becomes more problematic as the compactness of the con-
tinuation values are hard to ascertain. Moreover, the inevitability result be-
comes even more complicated, because we have to consider same stopping
time in the martingale case as a moving boundary in the submartingale case.
Our initial findings suggest that when the submartingale is generated from a
markovian martingale via a convex transformation, the same stopping time
in the martingale case can be found as a moving boundary however, the al-
most sureness can not be guaranteed and is dependent on both the initial
martingale, and the transformation used.
Relating our work to the existing literature is also essential in understand-
ing our contribution. There is a number of notable contributions in the con-
text of stochastic games. Indeed, recent studies by Fudenberg and Yamamato
(2010) and Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2010) generalize the Folk
Theorem of Dutta (1995) for irreducible stochastic games with the requirement
of a finite state space. Nevertheless, the setting we employ can be perceived as
a specific form of an irreducible stochastic game with perfect information, with
an infinite state space. Even tough Folk Theorems for irreducible stochastic
games can be found in the literature, to our knowledge, ours is the only one
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with an infinitely rich state space. 1
As a further research question one can look at the case when every player
has an identically and independently(with other players) distributed stochastic
discounting process. It is interesting to try to find analogies between deter-
ministically discounted repeated games and stochastically discounted repeated
games, and even just characterizing the set of subgame perfect strategies in
such a setting constitutes an avenue for future research.
1It is essential to note that the studies mentioned have less stringent requirements than
ours beside the richness of the state space.
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